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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Reliability Engineering is a field of engineering that studies the ability of a system (or 
component of a system) to function properly under specific conditions for a specific 
period of time; reliability analysis of such a system can take many forms. This thesis 
presents a quantified reliability study of a system that the author along with a team of 
Western Kentucky University Engineering students (designated Team ARTEMIS) 
designed, built, tested, and entered for competition in the Inaugural National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) Lunabotics Mining Competition in May 2010. A 
detailed quantitative analysis has been completed using both a Failure Mode, Effects, and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) system model to 
identify high priority items within the system calling for improvement. The results and 
conclusions drawn from this study will be utilized by the second generation Western 
Kentucky University Lunabotics Team—on which the author will take a lead role—for 
the next iteration of the system in order to perform critical redesign activities. 
Additionally, NASA and/or other space exploration organizations could use this study 
should this particular design be employed in the future for actual lunar excavation. 
Keywords: engineering, reliability, systems, lunar excavation, NASA, Western Kentucky 
University 
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This study is dedicated to ARTEMIS and to Artie himself. We’ll get ‘em next time! 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the world of engineering, reliability is defined as “the probability that an item will 
perform a required function without failure under stated conditions for a stated period of 
time.” [1, p. 3] A system can be designed and analyzed in terms of reliability and its 
optimization by making use of various analysis and modeling techniques. Two specific 
techniques have been implemented to analyze a system that the author helped to design 
and build in order to determine items to improve or add with the next iteration of the 
system. 
 
Background 
During the Fall 2009 and Spring 2010 semesters a team of Western Kentucky University 
Engineering students (designated Team ARTEMIS) designed, built, and tested a device 
(designated ARTEMIS Prime) to compete in the 1st Annual National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) Lunabotics Mining Competition in May 2010. According 
to competition specifications, the team was to design, build, and operate a remotely 
controlled device capable of excavating, transporting, and discharging lunar regolith 
simulant into a collector in the competition arena. During competition, teams were 
 2 
allowed 15 minutes to deposit as much regolith as possible. To simulate remote operation 
on the moon, the device operator was isolated from the excavator during competition, 
limited to the visibility provided by an overhead camera provided by the competition as 
well as any onboard cameras. Official design specifications and competition rules 
detailed the following non-exhaustive list of specifications: 
− maximum device dimensions: 2 meters by 0.75 meter by 1.5 meters 
− maximum system mass: 80.0 kg 
− that all power be provided by the onboard system 
− either telerobotic or autonomous operation 
− maximum communication bandwidth: 5.0 Mbps 
− minimum mass of excavated material: 10 kg [2, pp. 2-4] 
The team designed the device to be capable of collecting approximately 250 kilograms of 
regolith during the 15-minute competition attempt. 
As the competition challenge was divided into three main tasks—drive, dig, and 
deposit—the resultant device was divided into functional sub-systems of the same names. 
After considering several conceptual designs for each sub-system and for integration of 
the sub-systems and performing preliminary tests, the basic form of each system was 
decided upon. The drive sub-system—functioning to transport the device across the 
simulated lunar surface and to navigate obstacles—took the form of a set of tracks 
(Figure 1) purchased from a company specializing in track system design and 
manufacture; tracks were chosen (rather than wheels) for their superior turning ability, 
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weight, and cost effectiveness. Figure 2 depicts the integration of the tracks into the 
overall system. The dig sub-system—
functioning to remove regolith simulant 
from the competition surface and to store it 
within the device—took the form of a front-
end loader mechanism that employs a series 
of linkages that allow the scoop to achieve 
the desired motion (to lifting / lowering and 
turning) using a single linear actuator; this is depicted in Figure 3. The scoop was chosen 
 
Figure 2a (Above, Left): Tracks as integrated into SolidWorks Model 
Figure 2b (Above, Right): Tracks as integrated into actual device 
Figure 3a (Below, Left): Scoop mechanism as built 
Figure 3b (Below, Right): Scoop mechanism and linear actuator as integrated in SolidWorks 
Figure 1 (Above): Tracks as purchased 
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based upon weight and power consumption. The deposit sub-system—functioning to 
move excavated regolith simulant from the device to the competition collector—took the 
form of a conveyor equipped with scoops; Figure 4 depicts this subsystem. The conveyor 
was chosen for its efficiency and reliability (as it was purchased from a company 
specializing in conveyor design and manufacture). These sub-systems each connected to 
the collection hopper, shown in Figure 5, which facilitated both system integration and 
regolith storage. This hopper was designed and built custom to optimize regolith 
collection while facilitating efficient regolith removal via the conveyor (deposit 
subsystem). 
 
The control system for the device was based upon internet protocol (IP) control through a 
laptop interface. The system was powered with 24 Volts—dictated by the motors 
actuating the tracks—and all electrical and other electromechanical components were 
chosen based upon this voltage. Each major sub-system employed a separate motor 
Figure 4a (Left): 
SolidWorks model of conveyor as built 
 
Figure 4b (Right): 
Conveyor as integrated into system 
 
Figure 5 (Below): 
SolidWorks model of collection hopper 
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controller based upon current needs. Additionally, two cameras were installed to aid the 
operator in effectively controlling the drive, dig, and deposit functions. Figures 6 and 7 
depict the final device design and the final device itself. 
 
Figure 6: 
Solidworks model of final design for 
ARTEMIS Prime 
 
Figure 7: 
Final physical form of ARTEMIS Prime 
(moment before competition attempt)
The ultimate functional goal of the device was to deposit excavated lunar regolith 
simulant into the provided collector. This depended upon a conveyor successfully 
depositing regolith into the collector, which depended upon the scoop successfully 
excavating simulant and storing it in the hopper—not to mention the hopper successfully 
facilitating all of this; this depended upon the tracks transporting the system to and from 
the dig site. Thus, this ultimate functional goal depended upon proper function of every 
sub-system—including the control system—which is important to recognize in analyzing 
this system’s reliability. 
At the competition itself the device encountered several functional issues that were not 
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encountered during testing at WKU, resulting in two failed competition attempts. Since 
the majority of these issues related to the electrical / communication system, the 
mechanical components still lack testing / experience operating on the simulated lunar 
surface. The reliability of several of the device’s components—in particular those 
included in the control system—were called into question based upon observation at the 
competition. Issues with the deposit sub-system also introduced ambiguity into the 
conveyor and conveyor motor reliabilities. In attempt to gather as much information as 
possible concerning the other sub-systems, the team observed the issues—or lack 
thereof—that other teams with similar sub-systems experienced. For example, teams 
employing tracks experienced problems with the regolith simulant incapacitating their 
tracks; observations such as this contributed to the assessment of the reliability of the 
overall system. 
As stated previously, reliability refers to the probability of a device (subsystem, 
component, etc.) performing adequately for the intended competition duration and under 
the operating conditions expected [1, p. 3]. Reliability assessment calls for definitions of 
adequate performance, intended operation time, and anticipated operating conditions.  
Each was defined within competition guidelines. The device was to traverse the 
simulated lunar surface, to be capable of digging and depositing at least 10 kg of lunar 
regolith simulant, and to meet all of the criteria defined in the official rules. The device 
was to operate through testing, practice at the competition site, and during the 
competition in a dusty, simulated lunar environment. The team planned to ensure / 
enhance the reliability of its lunar excavation device in a number of ways, including 
designing custom fabricated components with a high factor of safety, derating 
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purchased components, and purchasing major components of two of the sub-systems 
from companies specializing in their design and manufacture. This also allowed the team 
to focus upon the system as a whole and upon the components/subsystems demanding 
more customization. 
 
Testing for Reliability 
The uniqueness of this system posed challenges in assessing its reliability. This system, 
rather than being one of many identical mass-produced systems, is entirely unique. 
Testing this device in order to aid in assessing its reliability would involve utilizing a 
sample size of 1 discovery testing method. In the case of this system, only one unit is 
available for testing due to the nature of the competition—more reflective of research and 
development than large-scale production. Certain limitations exist concerning reliability 
testing of single mechanical systems. The first concerns the actual testing of the device. 
The test designer and facilitator must recognize that testing must be done without 
anticipated failure—unless the failing component(s) are readily available for replacement, 
which is not necessarily the case here. [3, p. VII-24] Thus margin testing—a test in which 
the presence of a safety margin (or factor of safety) is verified [3, p. VII-23]—is often 
used. The order of the tests must also be designed so that those with the highest risk are 
performed last (so that testing can be completed efficiently). The second concern 
involves that of utilizing the results. The results obtained from the testing of a single 
device are certainly helpful in predicting the behavior of the rest of the population (or 
other devices that might be built in the future). However, the behavior of the tested 
 8 
device may represent any output from the best to the worst; there is no way to know with 
one unit. [3, p. VII-24] In this form of testing, it is best to first verify the operation / 
functionality of the device and then to verify the design / margins of safety. 
The functionality of the major purchased components of the system—the tracks, the 
conveyor, the motors, the linear actuator, the motor controllers, and the controller 
board—were each initially verified independently of the rest of the system before being 
implemented in order to discover any immediate issues. As the system was integrated, the 
three major functions—drive, dig, and deposit—were each tested in order to ensure that 
the desired motion was achieved—particularly in the case of the dig function. After this 
the tracks were tested in sand to verify their functionality on such a surface, and the 
safety margins of the scoop sub-system components were tested with weights simulating 
the mass of sand that would need to be lifted in each scoopful. The margin of safety 
associated with the conveyor motor (and with the conveyor scoops) was tested by 
manually filling the hopper with sand and observing the ability of the conveyor to unload 
the hopper. Then the entire device was tested in the sandbox driving (empty and full of 
sand), lifting scoops full of sand, and unloading the hopper full of excavated sand. 
However, the inability to test on lunar regolith simulant—due to a combination of 
availability and cost—was a major validation impediment. This pre-competition testing 
was also limited significantly by the absence of a functioning control system until days 
before leaving for the competition. On-site practice / testing was limited even more 
severely due to the absence of a functioning control system, eliminating the chance to 
operate / test the device on the playing surface prior to competition (and ultimately 
preventing activity during the competition attempts). One important feature that our 
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testing regime lacked was a system of manual switches for each of the device 
components that could have been used in debugging the mechanics of the device while 
the code to control the device was being written. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ANALYSES 
 
As mentioned previously, this system—ARTEMIS Prime—is unique in the sense that it 
represents a sample size of one and must be tested differently than items that are mass 
produced. This system also incorporates unique functional relationships, attributed 
largely to the human reliability inherent in this system. Human reliability is considered in 
situations in which people—in this case the operator of the device—can affect the 
operation of the devices. Human factors can include the probability of correct operation 
or maintenance, ability to detect and respond to failure conditions, and ergonomic or 
other factors influencing behavior / response. Human error probabilities are difficult to 
quantify as they are typically highly dependent upon training, experience, supervision, 
and motivational factors. [1, p. 169] Even the use of human factors in this study is 
unique; in some cases the presence of a human factor increases reliability as the operator 
of this system can react to unexpected—and thus un-planned-for—situations and those 
beyond the capabilities of a machine. Other unique applications were utilized in instances 
where the success of the device was enhanced but not strictly dependent upon the 
presence and/or proper function of a component. The occurrence of these will be 
highlighted throughout the discussion of each analysis. 
This project incorporates two specific reliability analysis / prediction techniques. 
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The first technique that will be presented is a design for reliability analysis technique 
known as a Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). The FMECA is a 
reliability evaluation and design review tool that investigates potential failure modes—
the symptom of a failure (not its cause) [3, p. V-12]—within a system or sub-system in 
order to determine the effect of each failure upon system performance and personnel 
safety. The FMECA is considered to be a “bottom-up” approach, starting with a specific 
failure and tracing up to its effect upon a system. The FMECA is useful in identifying 
potential design problem areas, including failures that cause other components to fail—
secondary failure events—and identification of single points of failure—items / functions 
whose failure would result in system failure and for which no redundancy or alternative 
operational procedures exist [3, p. II-55]. A FMECA report will highlight areas requiring 
corrective action, will rank the associated failures according to metrics such as severity 
and risk priority, and will recommend action to improve the system’s reliability. [4, p. 
198] 
The second technique that will be presented is a reliability prediction technique known as 
a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD). An (RBD) is a tool that can be used to model a 
system and to determine the reliability of said system. Such a model provides a picture of 
the functional interdependencies within a system in the form of a framework into which 
component and/or functional reliability estimates can be incorporated [4, p. 156]. Such a 
model (1) allows for easy visual identification of single points of failure and weaknesses 
within a system, (2) demonstrates component and/or functional relationships within a 
system, (3) provides a mechanism for quantifying such relationships—being particularly 
helpful for complex ones—and (4) allows for summarization of the various factors 
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contributing to system a system’s reliability [4, p. 156]. The RBD and the FMECA work 
together in that each can provide clarity to the other. Failures with the highest risk 
priority ranking according to the FMECA should roughly correspond to the items / 
functions / events most significantly lowering the overall reliability value in the RBD. A 
model such as this helps to guide design (and redesign) decisions by illustrating in a 
quantifiable manner the reliability of a system and the items affecting it most. 
 
Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
As mentioned previously, a Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a 
tool that investigates potential failure modes within a system or sub-system in order to 
determine the effect of each failure upon system performance and personnel safety. The 
FMECA tracks failures to their consequences in the system in terms of the physical 
potential results of a particular failure, the probability that said failure will occur, the 
severity of the failure should it occur, and the probability of detecting the failure. Another 
version of this analysis technique is the FMEA, which omits the criticality portion of the 
analysis. [3, p. V-8] 
This FMECA worksheet set takes the form of a series of spreadsheets in Microsoft Excel 
in which various quantitative and qualitative observations and judgments are recorded 
about the system’s potential failures. A worksheet exists for each functional sub-
system—drive, dig, and deposit—each of which includes those aspects of the control 
system which affect its performance. Each worksheet is organized by component. In 
some cases, a component is a single moving part. In others it is a group of several moving 
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parts that—in terms of potential failure modes—are so interdependent that for, the 
purpose of this analysis, they are considered to be a single component. Components are 
then broken down in terms of their associated potential failure modes. For each potential 
failure mode, potential effects of failure are listed; failure mechanisms—causes of 
failure—associated with each are also listed. The next two columns list the current 
controls in place for preventing and for detecting each failure, respectively. Entries in 
these five columns experience some overlap; for example, one failure mode may have 
three effects, four failure mechanisms, and two controls each of failure prevention and 
detection. Each combination of these five items has been assigned an Assessment 
Number for distinction and reference. 
The next five columns represent the risk assessment associated with each failure. The 
first three columns of these are values ranging from 1 to 10 that describe the probability 
of occurrence for a failure (P), the severity should said failure occur (S), and the 
probability of detecting the failure prior to use in its intended setting (D), respectively [3, 
p. V-10]. In order to conduct a valid assessment of each of these, controls must exist to 
ensure consistency with each type of ranking between components and functional sub-
systems. For this study, the author created a set of indices—one each for probability of 
occurrence, severity, and probability of detection, specifically applicable to this system 
and its goals—which provides ranking values and descriptions of each value’s meaning. 
Appendix C contains these Risk Assessment Indices. 
The next column represents the Risk Priority Number (RPN) for each assessment 
number; RPN = (P)(S)(D). [3, p. V-10]  The next value represents the Probability Value 
(PV) associated with each assessment number. This is another aspect of this 
 14 
analysis which is unique. The author has defined this term as PV = (P)(D), excluding the 
severity of the failure, as a quantitative measure to distinguish items which are most 
likely cause problems within the system. Some failures may be described with a very 
high severity but be relatively unlikely to occur and/or escape detection, resulting is a sort 
of false indication of priority. Using the PV along with the RPN, the author has been 
better able to draw quantitative conclusions regarding the system. Additionally, the RPN 
and PV entries for all assessment numbers associated with a particular component have 
been each added together in order to identify components requiring the most attention. 
The following three columns represent corrective actions—those recommended and those 
taken, respectively—and the person or sub-team responsible for implementation. Since 
the FMECA involves iterative design, upon recognition of pressing design issues / flaws, 
modifications and other actions were implemented—as time and resources allowed—for 
improvement. Following corrective actions and operation at the Lunabotics competition, 
the device was re-assessed in terms of P, S, and D; the resultant RPN and PV entries were 
then compared to the initial RPN and PV entries in order to assess improvement. One 
should note that some revised RPN and PV entries were higher (worse) than their 
associated initial entries due to problems experienced at the competition. Therefore, 
revised PRN and PV entries indicate items requiring attention during redesign. 
 
Reliability Block Diagram 
As mentioned previously, a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is a tool that can be used to 
model and find the overall reliability of a system.  An RBD is typically constructed based 
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upon functional system requirements and the components, systems, and/or functions 
satisfying said requirements. Data is typically input to an RBD in various forms, 
including reliability predictions, test data, field data, and customer requirements and use 
profiles [4, p. 156]. The detail to which a system is analyzed can be as great as 
accounting for duty cycles, service life limitations, wear-out, environmental factors, 
software, and human reliability [4, p. 156]. 
An RBD is often constructed in either hardware form or functional form. Component 
block diagrams are useful for incorporating reliability test data and prediction methods 
and for analyzing the relationships between those components; success probabilities for 
each component are determined and combined according to the structure of the diagram. 
Functional block diagrams use useful for better understanding (complex) systems [3, p. 
VI-6]. 
The two most basic and simple RBD modeling relationships are series and parallel, which 
are analogous to series and parallel circuits in electrical wiring schemes. The series model 
is used in instances where components (or functions) are single points of failure. If the 
failure of a component results in the failure of the entire system, that component is in 
series with the rest of the system [1, p. 124]. The parallel model is used when only one of 
a pair (or group) of components must function in order for the system to function. The 
parallel model can take any of the basic forms of active redundancy, standby redundancy, 
and m-out-of-n redundancy [1, pp. 124-126]. The former two are both incorporated into 
the model developed for this study and will be explained later in terms of their specific 
application in the analysis. 
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The RBD constructed for this study is a hybrid of the component and functional block 
diagram approaches. Generally, the top level of the analysis represents the major 
functional subsystems comprising the overall device while the lower levels of the 
analysis contain the various components comprising that subsystem. Though this 
approach may be less common, instances where events can cause failures as well as 
components demand the inclusion of blocks for said events [1, p. 124]. Within the lower 
levels of the analysis are scattered various functional blocks as were deemed appropriate 
that are themselves often comprised of components and/or human reliability estimations. 
The analysis mechanism itself has taken the form of a Microsoft Excel workbook 
comprised of a top level worksheet representing the basic functional subsystems of the 
overall system with succeeding worksheet representing the different branches and levels 
of the overall system. When a component or functional bock within a level is itself 
comprised of components, a new—lower—level is created to model the components of 
the parent block. The workbook is equipped with a mechanism for easy navigation of the 
model. 
The first worksheet of the workbook—the top level page—is entitled “ARTEMIS 
Prime”; this level contains four blocks. The value beneath each block refers to the 
reliability calculation from that specific subsystem level and branch. Each of the four 
blocks in this worksheet contains a link to the worksheet containing a model of the 
associated function / sub-system within the overall system. By following the link, one can 
view the subsystem worksheet—for example the “Dig” sheet. This worksheet contains 
both linked blocks and terminating blocks—ones not representing a sub(-sub)-
component. There is also a link to return to the top level. Each worksheet in the 
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workbook contains links to the levels immediately below and above as well as a link to 
the top level. Some linked blocks lead to worksheets that demonstrate the reliability 
prediction method used for that component / function rather than a deeper level of the 
model. 
The system analyzed for this study is at its core a series system—being comprised almost 
entirely of single points of failure; therefore, each component must be highly reliable in 
order to ensure success during competition. 
For a series of two components functions, events, etc, with reliabilities R1 and R2, the 
total reliability, RT, is determined from the following equation: 
21 RRRT ⋅=   (Eq. 1) 
In general, for a series of n, the following equation models the reliability [1, p. 124] 
∏
=
=
n
i
iT RR
1
  (Eq. 2) 
where Ri is the reliability of the ith component. The great lack of redundancy in this 
system is due in part to the design restrictions placed upon it by the customer—
competition rules and technical specifications. The reliability for most items was 
estimated based upon observed performance and/or calculated safety factors. (If a 
component has a factor of safety much greater than 1, it is considered to have a reliability 
of 1 (100%)). However, if reliability data was available, the component was modeled 
accordingly. (The specific method used for each component for which this was done will 
be detailed later.) 
Despite the overall series nature of the system, some blocks (components, 
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functions, etc.) were modeled using various forms of redundancy—specifically active and 
standby redundancy. Demonstration of both forms of redundancy can be seen in the 
modeling of determination of collected simulant volume. (This exists in the “Dig” 
function model regarding the “‘Full’ Indication” block (and model) and the “Hopper 
Partially Full” block.)  The instance of active redundancy modeling is in the “‘Full’ 
Indication” block—the determination of whether or not the collection hopper is full of 
collected simulant. Two methods exist by which this indication can be achieved: (1) by 
observing consistency in collection trials and using this observation to predict the number 
of scoopfuls that constitutes a full hopper and (2) by operator observation via onboard 
camera. Successful indication of a full hopper can include one or both of these methods; 
therefore, this model is one of active redundancy. Active redundancy exists in a system 
where satisfactory operation occurs if any number of the components in redundancy 
functions properly and is modeled by the following equation: [1, p. 125] 
( )∏
=
−−=
n
i
iT RR
1
11   (Eq. 3) 
where Ri is the reliability of the ith unit and n the number of units in parallel. 
However, it is important to note that the “full” indication itself is not strictly necessary. 
The system can still operate and successfully collect lunar regolith simulant even with a 
smaller volume of simulant is collected. The first attempt at modeling this was to 
consider a block representing a keynote component—in this case using the scoop 
subsystem in coordination with the drive function to move obstacles. However, upon 
researching this modeling method, its inapplicability to this situation quickly became 
apparent, as keynote—or keystone— components are typically used in 
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application of Bayes’ theorem to simplify complex configurations [5, p. 87]. Following 
research into other modeling methods, standby redundancy was determined to be the 
most appropriate for this application. (Standby redundancy refers to a system in which 
one unit—the standby unit—does not operate unless it is switched “on” in the case of 
failure of the active unit [1, p. 126].) Using this method, the active block represents the 
preferred method and the standby block, the alternative method. 
In this case, the “full” indication is considered the active option and the option in which 
the hopper is only partially full is considered the standby option. In order to model the 
standby redundancy here, a system with perfect switching and components with unequal 
failure rates was considered, according to the following equation [3, p. VI-16]. 
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where 1λ  represents the failure rate of active unit, 2λ  represents the failure rate of the 
standby unit, and t represents the total time of operation (in hours). Since 
t
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assuming an exponential distribution [4, p. 39], the following equation was used in the 
model. 
( )21
12
1
1)( RRRR t −
−
+= λλ
λ
  (Eq. 6) 
The failure rates for each of the components was determined by solving Equation 5 for 
λ , assuming a cumulative operation time, t, and using the estimated reliability from each 
block, respectively. (This method was implemented for each case in which 
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standby redundancy—with perfect switching and unequal component failure rates—was 
applied.) After doing this, all of the components of Equation 6 were known, and said 
model equation could be implemented. 
For this model, it is important to note that—in cases where reliability data was 
unattainable and physical stress / fatigue analysis was inapplicable—component 
reliabilities are based upon observations of either the component itself or a similar 
component / system. Therefore, as the performance of the system and its components was 
observed, the values changed. Since this set of models / analyses are to be used for 
redesign—a second iteration of the system—ARTEMIS Prime can be considered the test 
article. 
Appendix E contains detailed descriptions of each of the blocks and sub-models within 
the RBD. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
 
Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
The results of a FMECA are typically quantified using a Risk Priority Number (RPN), 
which incorporates probability of occurrence and detection of the failure as well as the 
severity of the failure. Along with the RPN, this analysis makes use of a Probability 
Value (PV) that incorporates only the probabilities of occurrence and detection in order 
to determine the items most likely to cause problems (regardless of severity). The 
highest—both initial and revised—RPN and PV terms are discussed in this section in 
order to indicate those items requiring most attention during redesign. 
Drive:  In the “Drive” FMECA worksheet, the highest initial overall RPN’s belong to the 
track treads—relating to regolith simulant becoming lodged in the joints of the treads—
the electrical system (highest contributors being wiring issues, problems with the 
program code and the RS80D motor controller) and to the scoop (in this case being used 
to move obstacles, relating most to insufficient practice and camera malfunction 
concerns). The RPN of the track motor was also relatively high due to potential overload 
and fatigue and the severe consequences of inability to complete a competition attempt. 
The highest initial PV’s belong to the electrical system, to the scoop, and to the track 
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motors—each for the same concerns as with the RPN’s. Here, the RPN’s and PV’s 
indicated the same weaknesses in the design. (One should note that potential 
consequences concerning with the treads were not fully realized until competition and 
were therefore not addressed prior to competition.) 
After observing issues other teams’ experienced with their track treads, measures were 
taken to prevent issues with regolith impeding track performance. These modifications 
have not been tested. The highest revised RPN’s and PV’s belong to the track treads, to 
the electrical system, to the scoop, and to the track motors. Confidence in the reliable 
performance of the CSD controller board diminished after issues encountered at 
competition, making it a higher contributor to the RPN’s and PV’s in the electrical 
system concerning the drive function. One should note that the RPN’s (initial and 
revised) for the battery are less indicative of its performance than the PV’s since, 
although failure severity is high, the battery is unlikely to experience failure. The battery 
failures are indicated as an issue in each FMECA according to the RPN’s, but according 
to the PV’s they present no real pressing concerns. 
Dig:  For the “Dig” function, in addition to the (initial) electrical RPN (with similar 
issues to those mentioned in the “Drive” function section), the initial RPN of the turning 
mechanism is also high, due mainly to unstable turning, loss of bushings, and loss of 
connection pins. Scoop lifting (linear actuator) involved uncertainty due to complex 
calculations and unknowns associated with operational conditions and therefore had a 
high initial RPN. Scoop lifting (lifting arms) experienced high RPN’s due to potential 
overload, which was difficult to accurately predict due to stress concentration unknowns. 
The same components experienced high PV’s; however, the greatest contributor 
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was unstable connections (for both the turning and the lifting arms). Here again, the PV 
helped to provide a clearer picture of the issues—in this case those associated with the 
lifting and turning mechanisms. 
Device testing confirmed linear actuator choice and lifting / turning arm design, and code 
revisions and rewiring increased confidence in the control system; however, issues with 
the CSD controller board and Sabertooth motor controllers experienced at competition 
diminished confidence in the control system. High revised RPN’s and PV’s include the 
electrical system. 
Deposit:  For the “Deposit” function, the highest initial RPN’s belong to the electrical 
system (due to wiring and code issues) and to the conveyor motor (due to conveyor 
overload or atypical loading and to insufficient voltage supply to the conveyor motor). 
Highest initial PV items include the electrical system (wiring, code, motor controller, and 
CSD controller board), the conveyor motor (same as for RPN’s), the hopper (deformation 
due to overload and inability to direct simulant to conveyor due to hopper floor angle), 
and the supports (due to overload). 
A number of yet unexplained issues occurred at the competition resulting in increased 
RPN’s and PV’s for the control system, the conveyor motor, and the conveyor itself—
relating to diminished rigidity due to weight-reduction modifications made to the 
conveyor chain structure prior to competition, leaving it untested. 
FMECA Overall:  In general most issues that occurred concerned the control system. 
During testing a fully properly functioning electrical system was never demonstrated. 
Additional control system issues (including communication, which is not explicitly noted 
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in any of the FMECA worksheets) manifested themselves at competition, increasing the 
number of unknowns associated with the control system. The RPN’s and PV’s in the 
FMECA worksheets reflect this statement. Other items requiring attention according to 
the FMECA worksheets are the tracks (particularly the sprocket-tread interface), the 
lifting and turning arms (concerning their unstable motion), the conveyor (concerning the 
rigidity of the chain structure and potentially the conveyor motor functionality), and the 
hopper (concerning effective direction of the regolith to the conveyor). 
 
Reliability Block Diagram 
The results of an RBD are quantified reliability probabilities for individual items, 
subsystems, and the overall system. By reducing the model for each functional subsystem 
to a series system, the highest contributors to the “unreliability” of the system can be 
identified. If this is done at each level for problem items, a fairly inclusive list of problem 
items for the system can be generated. This list and the items / failures noted from the 
FMECA worksheets should correlate. From these two, decisions can be made as to where 
to focus redesign efforts. 
Drive:  Excepting the control system, the “Drive” subsystem affects the reliability of the 
overall system most, with a reliability of only 0.471 (47.1%). Within the drive system, 
the two greatest contributors to unreliability are the tracks and the device location 
function / event. Affecting the tracks most are environmental factors that manifest 
themselves at the tread-sprocket interface. Concerning device location, the greatest 
impediment appears to be visibility, suggesting that a system that does not require 
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visibility may need to be designed and implemented for the function of device location. 
Dig:  The “Dig” subsystem has the highest reliability of the functional subsystems 
(0.888). Contributing most to its unreliability is the scoop subsystem. The reliabilities of 
the components of the scoop subsystem are nearly equal and relatively high. Concerning 
the collected volume indication in the dig subsystem, the “full” indication is again 
impeded by problems with visibility. While a system with higher visibility (improved 
camera reliability) or no need for visibility would not necessarily improve system 
reliability—and would therefore not be considered a priority—it would likely enhance its 
success. 
Deposit:  The reliability of the “Deposit” subsystem is 0.692. The item contributing most 
to its unreliability is the conveyor. Affecting most the performance of the conveyor is the 
conveyor chain. The conveyor from ARTEMIS Prime will be tested extensively in order 
to both accurately and precisely determine the affect of conveyor chain modifications on 
the conveyor’s ability to deposit regolith simulant before redesign is finalized. 
Control:  The control system contributes most to the unreliability of the system, with a 
reliability of 0.202. The two aspects affecting most the reliability of the control system 
are the communication (WiFi) and the electrical control. According to the model, the 
CSD controller board is the item most responsible for unreliability. The two Sabertooth 
motor controllers contribute second-most. The assignment of blame regarding the 
components within the control system is highly imprecise as the cause(s) of many of the 
issues were unable to be determined prior to competition.  
RBD Overall:  Overall, the RBD model suggests that the highest priority items for 
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redesign include the track tread-sprocket interface, device location system, conveyor 
chain, and various aspects of the control system. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FUTURE APPLICATION 
 
From the FMECA, the items with highest priority for further testing / redesign are the 
control system in general, the tracks (particularly the sprocket / tread interface), the 
conveyor (concerning the chain structure and potentially conveyor motor), the hopper 
(concerning translation of the regolith simulant to the conveyor base), and the lifting and 
turning arms (concerning fluidity of motion). The RBD adds to this list the device 
location system and suggests that an improved collected volume determination system 
would enhance the success of the system. 
System weaknesses associated with the drive function involve lunar regolith simulant 
deposits in the mechanical joints of the tracks. While operation in sand has been 
demonstrated effectively, the fine, abrasive qualities of the simulant material immobilized 
that tracks. Due to the severe and complete nature of the track failure observed, the drive 
subsystem will undergo conceptual redesign. The team currently plans to design a drive 
train in which joints and other such simulant-sensitive parts will not come into contact 
with the playing surface (regolith simulant) at all. 
The next high priority item was the conveyor. Since the exact cause of the conveyor 
issues experienced at competition has not been determined, additional testing of the 
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deposit subsystem is necessary. Despite these issues, the current team still believes the 
conveyor system to be an effective concept based upon performance during testing at 
WKU. Therefore, pending results from said testing, the current team plans to employ a 
very similar system, specifying a conveyor—particularly conveyor chain—more suited to 
the system’s needs. 
Next is the collection / storage hopper. ARTEMIS Prime’s hopper was optimized for 
maximum regolith simulant storage, assuming a (less than conservative) angle required 
for regolith to translate freely to the base of the conveyor. This complicated design did 
not effectively facilitate translation of regolith simulant to the base of the conveyor. 
Furthermore, it lacked rigidity, which was manifested in the lifting of heavy loads with 
the scoop. However, the hopper concept itself was very effective once the necessary 
modifications were made. The next hopper iteration will employ a greater floor angle as 
well as enhanced rigidity. 
The following three items are of lower priority as their particular “failures” do not cause 
the system itself to fail; however, their improvement will enhance the success of the 
system. The first of these is the scoop mechanism—particularly the connection points of 
the lifting and turning arms. The scoop mechanism concept proved successful; however, 
execution was a bit sloppy. In order to improve this item, potentially slight redesign and 
certainly more precision machining will be employed. The second and third of these are 
the collected volume determination system and the device location system. These systems 
will be redesigned conceptually, perhaps involving a type of sensing system and/or 
simply a more reliable onboard camera system. 
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In order to fully determine the plan of action for improving the control system, one must 
understand that the process by which the control system was developed was inherently 
flawed. No intermediate steps existed between control system design and (attempted) 
implementation of a completed control system. The control system itself involved several 
connection steps that had to be troubleshot simultaneously and quickly. The laptop 
interface (HMI) had to successfully send commands from the control station, which had 
to be running tested and proven code; the control station had to successfully establish 
wireless communication with the controller board onboard ARTEMIS Prime, which in 
turn had to command each of the motor controllers. When problems arose during testing, 
the team had to determine which of these steps was experiencing malfunction; 
troubleshooting a system implemented and tested in steps would have been much more 
straightforward and efficient. However, in the case of ARTEMIS Prime, by the time the 
mechanical components of the system were themselves integrated and then ready to be 
integrated with the control system, the competition date was fast approaching, and the 
system had seen no electrical implementation save battery power and physical “on/off” 
switches. 
In order to develop and test the electrical components simultaneously (as the mechanical 
system is being designed and built) with the second iteration of the lunar excavator 
(tentatively named ARTEMIS Double Prime), control will first be perfected via tethered 
control of ARTEMIS Prime and then via some sort of un-tethered control. (The control 
system conceptual design has not yet been finalized; therefore, based upon its form, 
additional steps may be implemented.) Pending a semi-complete Double Prime, tethered 
control testing will begin on the actual competition device, followed by un-
 30 
tethered control in preparation for competition. Mechanical and electrical development 
will occur simultaneously with correlated deadlines, which will be managed by a group 
of seniors on the team who will also be involved with the realization of said deadlines. 
This device completion scheme will also enhance mechanical development and 
troubleshooting as design weaknesses will be manifested earlier in the development with 
an (at least partially) functioning control system. 
In addition to the process of developing and testing the control system, the testing process 
for the mechanical components must undergo redesign. The (limited) testing ARTEMIS 
Prime underwent involved benign environmental and situational conditions; they were in 
fact less harsh and strenuous than those at the competition. These included operation in 
sand, which was less abrasive and likely to immobilize the tracks, operation with 
complete visibility of the system at all times, operation with the control station 
(transmitter) in very close proximity to the excavator (receiver), and operation under 
ideal communication conditions where other systems were not attempting connection 
over the same network. The excavator also operated for shorter amounts of time 
(continuously) than would occur at competition. The device did not experience any 
semblance of dress rehearsal. 
Beyond simulation of competition conditions, effective testing of the second iteration of 
this excavation device—expected (though not required) to last longer than the 
competition—should involve some form of accelerated life testing (ALT). Two generic 
methods for ALT include (1) testing continuously for a longer period of time than is 
expected (required) for use (competition) and (2) testing under higher stress levels 
(including harsher conditions) than anticipated [3, p. VII-16]. The first 
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method is relatively self-explanatory. The second—as used in this application—would 
potentially involve testing on a playing surface of a more abrasive and sticky substance 
than the lunar regolith simulant (Black Point-1 for the 2011 competition) for accelerated 
drive train testing, lifting more than anticipated weight with the scoop mechanism, and 
packing excavation material (sand or other simulant material that is used) into the hopper 
to test the deposit subsystem’s ability to remove it. 
Additional suggestions based upon observation of the system concern weight. Many if 
the last-minute modifications made to the system were due to the system being over the 
weight competition specification. In researching high-weight components—including but 
not limited to motors and conveyor chain—the team will make weight a more highly-
considered criterion.  
The application of this study has potential to extend beyond the 2011 Lunabotics Mining 
Competition. One goal of developing this device is that its concept and/or design be used 
one day in actual lunar excavation. The higher the quality of the design and performance 
of the system at competition the more likely this becomes. The analyses themselves could 
potentially serve as a template for analysis and reliability prediction of future iterations of 
the device. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis in conjunction with the Reliability 
Block Diagram system model of the ARTEMIS Prime Lunar Excavator has resulted in a 
set of suggested modifications / improvements for the second iteration of the device—
ARTEMIS Double Prime—to be entered in the 2011 Lunabotics Mining Competition. 
Complete redesign will take place concerning the control / communication system as well 
as the drive train. The collection / storage hopper will undergo detailed redesign, while 
the general concept for it will likely persist. The scoop mechanism will be realized using 
more precise machining techniques. Conveyor chain selection will be more customized 
for the application and design specifications / constraints. Additionally, the device 
location (and collected volume determination) methods will be redesigned. The design 
and verification processes themselves for the control system will be executed differently 
and in better correlation with the mechanical component design and verification 
processes. The testing methods for Double Prime will be revised, incorporating 
accelerated life testing in one or both of the two general forms discussed. The design 
process of the ARTEMIS Double Prime Lunar Excavator will an iterative one, as the 
design will be monitored via analysis techniques similar to those implemented here in 
order to optimize reliability. 
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APPENDIX C 
FMECA RISK ASSESSMENT INDICES 
 
Table 1: Lunabot Failure Probability of Occurrence Index 
Rank Description Criteria 
Testing demonstrates satisfactory performance 
Safety factor > 2 
Very few (or no) unknowns associated with component 1-2 
Remote 
Probability 
High confidence in designer/manufacturer 
Testing demonstrates mainly satisfactory performance OR no testing has 
taken place 
Safety factor > 1.5 
Few unknowns associated with component 
3-4 Low Probability 
Moderate - high confidence in designer/manufacturer 
Testing demonstrates mediocre performance OR no testing has taken 
place 
Safety factor low or unknown 
Several unknowns associated with component 
5-6 Moderate Probability 
Moderate confidence in designer/manufacturer 
No testing has occurred* 
Safety factor low or unknown** 
Several unknowns associated with component 
7-8 High Probability 
Low confidence in designer/manufacturer 
No testing has occurred* 
Safety factor low or unknown** 
Several unknowns associated with component 
9-10 Very High Probability 
Very Low confidence in designer/manufacturer 
*Presumably, if testing indicated poor performance, changes were automatically made 
**Presumably, if safety factor is <1.5, changes were made automatically 
 
 
 35 
 
Table 2: Lunabot Failure Effect Severity Index 
Rank Criteria* 
1 No risk to observers; no damage to system; little or no drop in functional mission/sub-
mission efficiency 
2 No risk to observers; minor damage to system; minor drop in functional mission/sub-
mission efficiency 
3-4 No risk to observers; minor to moderate damage to system; moderate drop in functional 
mission/sub-mission efficiency 
5-6 No risk to observers; moderate damage to system; significant drop in functional 
mission/sub-mission efficiency 
7-8 No risk to observers; moderate damage to system; mission loss 
9-10 Potential injury to observers; severe damage to system; mission loss 
  
*Criteria based upon desire to avoid 1) damage to system, 2) drop in efficiency of travel, 
excavation, retention, or deposit (mission functions), and 3) mission loss 
 
 
Table 3:Lunabot Probability of Failure Detection Index 
Rank Description Factors* 
Failure mechanism (and mode) visibly manifested 1-2 Failure almost always detected prior to competition Sufficient testing conducted to test failure mechanism 
Failure mechanism (and mode) visibly manifested 
3-4 Failure frequently detected prior to competition Insufficient testing conducted to test failure mechanism 
Failure mechanism (and mode) somewhat visibly 
manifested 5-6 Failure infrequently detected prior to competition Sufficient testing conducted to test failure mechanism 
Failure mechanism (and mode) somewhat visibly 
manifested 7-8 Failure rarely detected prior to competition Insufficient testing conducted to test failure mechanism 
Failure mechanism (and mode) invisibly manifested 9-10 Failure virtually impossible to detect No testing conducted to test for failure 
*Note in report that factors contributing to detection are visibility of failure mechanisms (and 
modes), sufficiency of testing conducted, and care taken by test observers; chose the lower value 
when observers are unlikely to be looking for failure (taking "care") 
 
 36 
 
 
APPENDIX D 
DETAIlED FMECA WORKSHEET DESCRIPTIONS 
 
ARTEMIS Prime FMECA Worksheets: 
The FMECA for the ARTEMIS Prime Lunar Excavator utilizes three worksheets: one 
each for the three main functional sub-systems—“Drive”, “Dig”, and “Deposit”. The 
aforementioned Risk Assessment Indices generated for this study facilitated relatively 
straightforward ranking. However, some items still fell outside the ranking descriptions 
in the indices; others simply require additional explanation for clarity. The following 
describes the ranking decisions made in these cases. Refer to Appendix C for the 
FMECA Risk Assessment Indices. 
 
“Drive” Function: 
DR-1a.1: Concerning the detection ranking, the failure mode mechanism was visible, 
while the mechanism was not; therefore, the item was ranked with an average of the 
values representing these two conditions. 
DR-1b: See DR-1a.1 description. 
DR-1c: The high severity ranking in this case is due to the fact that a device cannot 
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function if the proper code is not implemented / executed 
DR-1d: The severity rank is indicative of a single occurrence. Should the operator 
make multiple mistakes, the severity would increase; however, as the probability rank 
indicates, this is unlikely. 
DR-2c: In this case—concerning severity—there exists no risk to observers, and no 
system damage resulting from the failure. However, there does exist potential for a 
significant drop in efficiency. The severity ranking is reflective of this combination of 
factors. 
DR-4a: This severity rating is reflective of a situation in which—resulting from this 
particular failure—there exists no risk to observers, minor-to-moderate damage to the 
system, and little or no drop in efficiency. 
DR-5b: Concerning the probability of occurrence, this failure did occur in practice; 
however, the team cleaned the treads periodically—specifically prior to competition—in 
order to lower the probability of occurrence. 
DR-5c: For this item, one should note that this failure was not manifested until the 
competition during another team’s competition attempt. (This team’s device employed 
the same track models; this is considered valid data for ARTEMIS Prime since the latter 
was unable to test this functionality due to failure to execute the drive function on the 
competition surface due to electrical / communication issues).  
DR-7a: For this item, the detection ranking is reflective of a failure that is visible but 
only if it is specifically sought, as it would occur in the underside of the system. 
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DR-8c: Regarding the severity ranking, if the system is able to perform maneuvers 
during the competition attempt and to continue with the attempt, this failure should only 
cause damage to the device and cost time. 
DR-8d: See DR-8c description. 
DR-8e: See DR-8c description. 
 
“Dig” Function: 
DI-1a.1: See DR-1a.1 description. 
DI-1b: See DR-1a.1 description. 
DI-1c: See DR-1c description. 
DI-1d: See DR-1d description. 
DI-2a: The final probability rank is based both on testing and on the fact that the 
factor of safety is less than 1.5. 
DI-3a: The severity rank is reflective of potential mission loss. 
DI-3b: The severity rank is reflective of no risk to observers, little damage to the 
system, and moderate drop in efficiency as a result of the failure. 
DI-3c: See DI-3b description. 
DI-3d: See DI-3b description. 
DI-3e: See DI-3b description. 
DI-3f: The severity rank is reflective of no risk to observers, damage to the 
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system, and potential mission loss as a result of the failure. 
DI-3g: The severity rank for this item differs from the others for which the potential 
effect of failure is also “failure to turn scoop to desired position”; in items DI-3a - e, there 
existed potential to drop efficiency more than in this item (DI-3g) 
 
“Deposit” Function: 
DE-1d: See DR-1d description. 
DE-1e: The probability of occurrence increased from the initial risk assessment to 
the revised risk assessment because the number of unknowns increased. 
DE-1f: See DE-1e description. 
DE-2a: The “atypical load conditions” refer to loading conditions for which the 
system was not designed. The changes mentioned in the Actions Taken entry include 
chain modification (removal of middle sections of the chain), removal of some moving 
side guides, and additional taping to ensure complete seal of the chain. There existed 
issues with pulling the load at competition; however, it is not certain if these were due to 
the modified conveyor structure or due to problems with the motor control. This affected 
the detection ranking, as the cause (mechanism) is difficult to identify. 
DE-3: The cause and effect relationship here could be considered a “snowball 
effect”. Increased wear would increase likelihood (and rate of occurrence) of teeth 
jumping, which would increase wear, etc, eventually ceasing operation of the conveyor. 
The revised value for probability should actually be increased. Once the belt tensioning 
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mechanism was improved, performance was also much improved; however, just before 
competition the belt was jumping teeth. 
DE-4: This probability rating reflects the fact that though this will certainly occur, 
the rate has been significantly decreased by preventative controls. The severity ranking 
for this item reflects the fact that it can happen quickly. 
DE-5a: This probability rating reflects the fact that though this will certainly occur, 
the rate has been significantly decreased by preventative controls. 
DE-5b: Modifications to chain may have given rise to atypical load conditions. 
DE-5c: See DE-5b description. 
DE-6: See DE-5a description. 
DE-7a: This probability rating reflects the probability of this occurring during 
competition. 
DE-9c: This probability rating reflects the fact that though this will certainly occur, 
the rate has been significantly decreased by preventative controls. The detection ranking 
reflects that, while this failure would be easy to detect, the operators might not be looking 
for it. 
DE-10a: Probability ratings reflect the unknowns associated with these components 
prior to testing (initial values) and then increased confidence after testing (revised 
values). The severity ranking indicates that this would unlikely disqualify the device as it 
would have been measured / weighed before this.  
DE-10b: Probability ratings reflect the unknowns associated with these components 
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prior to testing (initial values) and then increased confidence after testing (revised 
values).  
DE-10c: See DE-10b description.  
DE-10d: See DE-10b description.  
 
The reader should note that early application in the design cycle results in higher benefit 
than application after the design is finalized. [4, p. 198] However, while this system was 
analyzed late in the design / construction process, this analysis still provides tremendous 
benefit in the form of identification of points of improvement for the next iteration of the 
device which is very early in its design phase and will be similar to ARTEMIS Prime.
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APPENDIX E 
DETAILED RBD BLOCK AND SUB-MODEL DESCRIPTIONS 
 
ARTEMIS Prime RBD Model: 
The system RBD for the ARTEMIS Prime Lunar Excavator consists of four main sub-
models: three main functions—“Drive”, “Dig”, and “Deposit”—as well as the control 
system. The three functions will be discussed first, beginning with the “Drive” Function. 
“Drive” Function: 
Tracks:  The first block (in series) represents the tracks. These are modeled by 
connecting their component blocks in series and estimating their reliabilities based upon 
design specifications versus the device’s required performance. Since the tracks used in 
this system were designed to carry a heavier load than they would encounter in this 
application, their components were given high reliability ratings. Since the ability of the 
track motors to provide enough torque to carry the system at its heaviest on regolith 
simulant was (and is still) unknown, the motors have been given a slightly lower 
reliability rating. An environmental factor block has also been introduced (into the tread-
sprocket interface block) in order to account for observation of similar systems at the 
Lunabotics Competition. (A team with the same track system as the one described here 
experienced trouble in the form of regolith simulant building up in between the sprocket 
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teeth and causing the tracks to jump teeth rather than function properly.) 
Obstacle Handling:  The next set of blocks represents obstacle handing. These are 
modeled in standby redundancy, with the preferred (active) method of obstacle handling 
considered to be navigation around said obstacle(s) and the alternative (standby) method, 
the removal of the obstacles. The first of these blocks—the active block—represents an 
action—the ability to navigate around an obstacle. This is the first specific encounter with 
a human reliability factor. The device—in this case the tracks—may operate flawlessly, 
but if the operator is unable to execute the function—in this case navigate around 
obstacles—then the device is not successful. Since the device has never been tested 
(navigating around obstacles) on the lunar regolith simulant surface, this reliability value 
was estimated based simply upon experience testing the device on sand and observing 
navigational difficulties and successes. The standby block also represents an action—the 
ability to move obstacles. In the case that navigation around obstacles is deemed 
impossible or impractical, said obstacle must be removed in order to allow passage. This 
component was modeled using the reliability determined for the scoop subsystem (which 
will be described under the Dig section) multiplied by a factor to account for potential 
additional stress on the system and for human reliability. 
Device Location:  The next set of blocks was also modeled as standby redundancy with 
perfect switching and unequal component failure rates. It represents the indication to the 
operator that the device has reached the collection bin. The active block represents the 
device’s indication and the standby block represents the operator’s interpretation of this. 
The reliability of the active block is determined by a series sub-model including 
prediction of the successful operation of the components of this function—rocker 
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sensor, bumper (to which the sensor is attached), and LED markers (which light when the 
sensor is tripped). Successful operation of the sensor and bumper is likely; however, it is 
less likely that the LED markers will be visible to the operator when they are lit. The 
standby block again represents human reliability—in this case the ability to discern from 
the overhead cameras the position of the device in relationship to the collection bin. This 
was estimated based upon experience and observed visibility via overhead cameras. 
Supports:  The next (and final) block (in series) in the Drive subsystem model represents 
the supports ensuring a rigid drive train. These supports were designed to have a safety 
factor of greater than 1; it was actually much greater than 1. Therefore, the reliability if 
this block is 1. 
 
“Dig” Function: 
Scoop Subsystem: 
The first block in the “Dig” function represents the scoop subsystem, which is the main 
physical subsystem of this function. Linear Actuator:  The first block in the scoop sub-
system model represents the linear actuator. This component was derated in order to 
enhance its reliability. A component or subsystem can be derated by: (1) using an item in 
such a way that the applied stresses are below rated values or, (2) by lowering the rating of 
an item in one stress field in order to allow an increase in rating in another stress field [3, 
p. V-77]. The linear actuator used in the digging function is rated at 1500 lbs for 1 
million inches of travel (approximately 700 hours of operation); by the first definition 
above, the device was operated a maximum of 1100 lbs for less than 10 hours. 
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The reliability test data obtained for this component from the manufacturer was used to 
predict its reliability (at the device maximum load rating of 1500 lbs). This component 
was modeled by the 2-Parameter Weibull distribution. The following represents the 
Weibull distribution as used to predict reliability [4, p. 41]. 
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where t refers to the total operation time (in hours),  refers to mean time to failure 
(MTTF)—life expectancy—and  refers to a scaling factor. In this case a  value 
corresponding to infant mortality ( < 1)—for “burn-in” period, decreasing failure rate [4, 
p. III-62], in this case  = 0.8—was chosen since the linear actuator was expected to be in 
operation for a very short period of time compared to its life expectancy and would 
therefore fail due to defects rather than wear-out. The value for  was determined based 
on the total expected travel (1 million inches) of the linear actuator and its top speed (0.4 
in/s). The total operation time (which was used for reliability prediction of all 
components / functions) was estimated to be 10 hours. 
Linkages:  The next block in the scoop sub-system model represents the linkage system 
used to lift and turn the scoop. This was modeled by a series model of the linkage 
components / events—linear actuator link component, arms, connector pins, and the 
bushing presence event. Each of these components (bushing included) was designed / 
purchased to have a safety factor greater than 1 (much greater than one in the case of the 
pins and bushings). In order to verify safety factors, simple stress calculations were 
performed on items with simple geometries. However, the geometry of some of the 
components—in particular the linear actuator link component and the scoop 
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lifting arms—was sufficiently complicated to require FEA modeling of stresses using 
SolidWorks Simulation. However, stress overload isn’t the only mechanism by which the 
bushings can fail. They can also fail by shifting from their set position (even though 
measures have been taken to ensure that this doesn’t happen). Similar to the obstacle 
handling and obstacle location models described in the “Drive” function, the bushings are 
not strictly necessary for operation of the system. However, their proper function 
contributes incredibly to the successful operation of the system. To clarify, the scoop will 
very likely still lift and turn should the bushings be removed; however, the scoop will 
likely not lift and/or turn to the necessary position without the bushings. (This function 
has not yet been tested.) The bushing presence event has been modeled as a standby 
redundancy scenario; however, it should be noted that introducing a standby redundancy 
event situation changed the reliability very little from the series model due to the small 
likelihoods that the bushings will fail and that the scoop would function properly in the 
event that the bushings did fail (were lost). 
Scoop:  The final block in the scoop sub-system model represents the scoop itself, which 
is modeled by another series of components / events—teeth, shell, connector pins, and 
another bushing presence event very similar to the one described for the linkages. The 
teeth, shell, pins, and bushings themselves are considered infallible due to their high 
safety factors (much greater than 1). The only modification made (from the linkage 
bushing presence event model) for the scoop bushing presence event model is the 
reliability prediction (slightly higher) for the scoop in the event that the bushings are lost. 
Collected Volume Determination:  Rising a level—back to the “Dig” function model, 
the next block represents the “full” indication of the hopper—a signal to stop 
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collecting lunar regolith simulant. This block represents a sub-level model incorporating 
two indication methods in active redundancy—(1) observing consistency in collection 
trials and using this observation to predict the number of scoopfuls that constitutes a full 
hopper and (2) operator observation via onboard camera. However, the “full” indication 
itself is not strictly necessary. The system can still operate and successfully collect lunar 
regolith simulant even with a smaller volume of simulant is collected. Therefore, the 
“full” indication itself (the preferred, or active, option) is modeled in standby redundancy 
with an event stating that less than the desired amount of simulant is collected. 
Hopper and Supports:  The next block in the “Dig” function represents the hopper; the 
hopper was tested, modified according to its behavior and consequent necessary 
improvements, and then retested to confirm its conformity to design requirements. 
Though it is not perfectly reliable since it has the potential to leak regolith simulant, its 
reliability prediction value is very high. The next block represents the supports for the 
hopper and scoop subsystem. As mentioned in the “Drive” function section, all supports 
were designed to have a safety factor much greater than 1; therefore the reliability of the 
supports is considered to be 1. 
 
“Deposit” Function: 
Conveyor:  The first block represents the conveyor and its various components. The 
conveyor itself was manufactured by an external source whose design was not intended 
to convey small abrasive particles—including sand and lunar regolith simulant; for this 
reason, wear became a failure mode worth considering. The design team considered 
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options such as replacing key components prior to competition in order to ensure proper 
function. However, initial tests of the conveyor moving sand quickly revealed that wear 
was not the immediate issue but sand (or regolith simulant) lodging in the many joints of 
the conveyor, increasing the torque necessary to turn the conveyor. In order to treat this 
issue the design team—after considering several options—decided to line the conveyor 
chain—including its moving side guides—with duct tape to create a seal. Now, the main 
concern was ensuring that the tape remained sufficiently adhesive; a plan was developed 
to replace the tape prior to the competition. 
However, as constructed reached completion (and competition drew nigh), the overall 
system was discovered to be exceeding the weight limitations set by the competition 
rules. Each option for weight reduction was considered according a cost-benefit 
philosophy in terms of potential weight reduction versus functional penalty. Several items 
were altered or sacrificed. For example, competition strategy was modified to 
accommodate the removal of one onboard camera; sections of material were removed 
from components such that neither structural integrity nor regolith containment was 
sacrificed. The team estimated the potential weight loss from removing sections of the 
conveyor chain such that chain could overall maintain its shape and its functionality, 
finding it to be the greatest contributor to the weight loss goal; therefore, the chain was 
modified and then duct tape used not only to seal the chain but now to cover its bare 
chain. Figures 8 and 9 represent the original chain and the modified chain, respectively, 
each without duct tape applied. 
The team was unable to test this modification prior to departure for the competition. 
During competition practice days, the device faced and overcame several issues; 
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however, conveyor malfunction was not one of the resolved issues. Post-competition the 
device has been under repair and investigation, and current evidence suggests that the 
conveyor malfunction was not a product of the chain modifications or malfunction of the 
conveyor motor. Bearing all of this in mind, the reliability of the conveyor and its 
associated components was considered to be relatively high, with a lower score for the 
chain itself since a reduction in rigidity may have contributed to the malfunction 
mentioned previously. 
Another functional issue concerning the conveyor was the tensioning of the timing belt 
that transferred torque from the conveyor motor to the conveyor’s drive shaft. Due to a 
poor tensioning method, the belt sometimes did not grip motor pulley properly—
particularly when experiencing high torque. However, once an improved tensioning 
system was implemented, the problem was almost completely mitigated. This is reflected 
in the reliability rating for the “Timing Belt / Pulleys” block. 
Emptied Volume Determination:  The next set of blocks in the “Deposit” function 
model represents the indication that the regolith simulant collection / retention hopper has 
been emptied completely (or nearly so) by the conveyor. This is modeled virtually 
Figure 8 (Left): 
Unmodified chain 
section 
 
Figure 9 (Right): 
Modified chain 
section 
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identically to the “full” indication model described in the “Dig” function section—
through active redundancy where the operator attempts to establish consistency in the 
time taken to deposit a load of regolith while also monitoring the onboard and overhead 
cameras. Unfortunately, the onboard cameras did not function at competition (and were 
likely the cause of the malfunction that ultimately kept the device from operating at 
competition, which will be described later); therefore, their reliability rating is very low. 
Since the “empty” indication itself is not strictly necessary, it is modeled in standby 
redundancy with the event that the hopper is only partially emptied (standby case), which 
is a highly probable event, assuming proper function of the conveyor. 
Hopper and Supports:  The next block represents the hopper in terms of its role in the 
“Deposit” function. For this function, the hopper must be able to connect to the conveyor 
so that its contents (lunar regolith simulant) are transferred from the former to the latter 
while preventing simulant from leaking into the conveyor. Connecting the two 
components was relatively 
simple; however, sustaining no 
regolith loss to the inside of the 
conveyor was more difficult to 
achieve. The final device 
included a combination of a 
rubber flap and a foam insert 
(Figure 10) to seal the inside of 
the conveyor from the 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: 
Rubber flap and 
foam insert 
conveyor-to-hopper 
sealing mechanism. 
(Red ellipse 
indicates location 
where foam is 
inserted.) 
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simulant. The flap and insert had to be reset periodically; however, this solution was 
overall effective. The reliability rating for the hopper in this section reflects this. 
The final block in the “Deposit” function model represents the supports. Again, these 
were designed to have a safety factor of much greater than 1; therefore, for the purpose of 
this analysis, they are considered infallible (reliability of 1). 
 
Control System: 
The fourth and final sub-model of ARTEMIS Prime is the control system. HMI 
(Laptop):  The first block in this sub-model represents the human-machine interface 
(HMI) used in this system—the laptop interface. The interface was designed to execute 
commands upon registering a mouse click event for a specific button. This method was 
highly unreliable in the beginning stages of testing—being unable to register and/or relay 
commands most of the time; however, by the time of the competition, its reliability had 
improved—the command was registered / relayed nearly 100% of the time. The HMI’s 
reliability reflects this. 
WiFi Communication:  The next block in the control system model represents the 
reliability of the communication was system’s (WiFi) communication system. During 
testing at WKU prior to leaving for the competition, communication was fairly reliable. 
However, at the competition site, communication with the device was nearly impossible 
to achieve accept when operating under the practice and competition networks (which 
were reserved for the teams actually operating on the playing surface at that time); this 
difficulty was likely due to the number (20+) of teams attempting communication with 
 52 
their devices at the same time. There was not sufficient time on the playing surface to 
completely diagnose the issues the device (and operator) experienced with 
communication; therefore one can only speculate as to the contribution of the WiFi 
communication system to this. The reliability rating for this component of the control 
system reflects an educated estimate based upon experience and observation. 
Electrical Control: 
The next block represents the electrical control system, which is composed of several 
components in series. Track Motor Controller1:  The first block—the RS80D Motor 
Controller—was intended to be modeled using test data from the manufacturer; 
unfortunately, several contacts to the manufacturer yielded no access to test data. 
However, research of the controller manual resulted in some insight in to the controller’s 
expected operation. The manual states that “no warrantee of suitability or performance 
for any purpose [is provided] for the controller”; it also states that in some cases where 
the motor fails it becomes “lock[ed] in the “ON” position with no ability to stop the 
motor that is being controlled” [6, p. 9]. This typically occurred when the controller was 
left idle for 30 seconds or more. In order to eliminate device failures, the electrical design 
team devised a method for ensuring that the controller was constantly being sent a 
command of some kind (the “STOP” command when locomotion was not required). The 
reliability rating for this motor controller reflects the controller’s reliability including our 
adjustments to prevent failure. 
                                                 
1
 Each of the motor controllers was derated—chosen to have a higher current rating than would be 
reached—in order to enhance their reliability. 
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Scoop Motor Controller2:  The next block represents the 2x25 Sabertooth Motor 
Controller used to control the linear actuator. Like the RS80D Motor Controller, the 
Sabertooth was intended to be modeled according to test and/or reliability data obtained 
from the manufacturer. The manufacturer responded to the initial request for data by 
requesting more information about the controller’s use in this system and promised 
information; however the information was never received, even after several reminder e-
mails. Attempts are still being made at attaining the information. In the meantime this 
component’s reliability is based upon performance at the competition (during practice), 
which was successful. 
Conveyor Motor Controller:  The next block represents the 2x25 Sabertooth Motor 
Controller used to control the conveyor motor. This is the same model used to control the 
linear actuator for the “Dig” function. (Two separate controllers were used—one for the 
linear actuator and one for the conveyor motor). Pending information from the 
controller’s manufacturer, this component’s reliability is based upon performance at the 
competition (during practice). The conveyor motor was not controlled successfully; 
however, this was likely due to an issue with the controller board and not the motor 
controller. However, a small amount of smoke was observed issuing from this controller 
at one point. 
Controller Board:  The final block represents the controller board used for this system. 
It was designed and built custom for this application by Custom Design Solutions. The 
board was built to the electrical design team’s specifications; however—as initial post-
                                                 
2
 The reliability of the Sabertooth controllers as used in this application was initially enhanced due to 
familiarity of the electrical engineering sub-team with this motor controller. 
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competition investigations suggest—at the competition when the cameras were connected 
to the device, they drew more current than the board was designed to accommodate, 
causing certain connections on the board to fail. Even though the board performed to 
specification, those specifications were not in line with the actual needs of the system. 
The reliability rating of this device reflects this discrepancy. 
Power Supply and Electrical Connections:  Rising a level to the control system model, 
the next block represents the power supply (battery). When functioning properly, the 
battery provided more than enough power for the system to operate during the 
competition; furthermore, it can be charged to ensure optimum operation. However, the 
week before the competition, one of the two batteries failed due to a dead cell; the spare 
was used for the competition. Consequently, confidence in the battery’s reliability 
dropped significantly. The final block in this model represents the electrical connections 
within the system. The reliability of these components is difficult to evaluate. The team 
experienced very little trouble that could be specifically and directly attributed to faulty 
electrical connections; however, there were instances when unexplained occurrences 
could have been the result of such. The associated reliability rating reflects this. 
 
